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Competitive and Fair: The Case for
Exporting Stronger Extraterritorial
Labor and Employment Protection
By CARSON SPROTT*
I. Introduction
The application and enforcement of U.S. labor and employment
laws to American workers abroad is wildly varied. Employees of
U.S. corporations abroad may be treated identically, or have
inconsistent levels of protection, depending on the law applied and
their status as a U.S. citizen, resident alien, or foreign national.
Under some statutes, an alien working for a foreign corporation on
U.S. soil may have greater protection than a U.S. citizen working for
a U.S. corporation abroad.
This reflects incoherent U.S. labor and employment policy and
a dearth of consistent judicial decisions. It results in unequal
protection of the U.S. labor force.' Furthermore, U.S. corporations
and their subsidiaries are not held to many U.S. labor and
*J.D. candidate, May 2010, University of California, Hastings College of the
Law. The author would like to thank Professor Reuel Schiller of U.C. Hastings
College of the Law and Professor David Rosenfeld of U.C. Berkeley School of Law
and Weinberg Roger & Rosenfeld for their invaluable guidance on this project. He
would also like to thank Laurie Pagan-Ozga, Sherman Chin, and Carolyn Lee for
showing him the ropes.
1. "Unequal" is defined by employment activity in the employment territory
and the nationality of the employee. See William S. Dodge, Understanding the
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 85, 87 (1998),
distinguishing between the conduct of an activity and the effects of an activity as
indicating whether statutory authority is based on either territory, nationality, or
both. According to Dodge, "When both the conduct and the effects of an activity
occur entirely within a single state, one may safely characterize that state's
regulation of the activity as 'territorial.'" Id. When, on the other hand, the conduct,
the effects, or both occur outside the regulating state, the regulation may be
characterized as 'extraterritorial' to at least some degree, and therefore based on
nationality. Id.
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employment standards when employing foreigners abroad, even
when the laws of that nation permit such protections.
Going beyond seeking economic advantages in a global
workforce,2 corporations are permitted discriminatory employment
practices that would be punished harshly in the United States.
Finally, while it is beyond any cultural obligation to enforce all of
our societal values abroad, there are certain core global labor
standards that must be upheld. Scholars have identified five core
labor standards worldwide.3  These core standards are:
nondiscrimination in employment based on gender, ethnicity, and
other similar factors; freedom of association; collective bargaining
over working conditions; prohibition of forced labor; and
prohibition of exploitative forms of child labor.4 The United States
adopts these protections on its own soil, but noticeably fails to
require U.S. corporations to uphold the same standards abroad,
sometimes even in application to its own citizens.5 By comparison,
U.S. labor and employment laws consistently apply to documented
aliens working legally on U.S. soil.6
While the system of using the sovereign host's employment
laws as the only applicable standard has been a part of the
American legal landscape since 1908,7 it has not gone without
consequences. The judicial practice of permitting unequal
protection for labor has resulted in widespread discrimination
2. See Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A
Historical Review and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351, 386 (2002) (stating that
"[t]he emergence of the global economy has put great pressure on American
business to reduce costs in order to compete internationally.").
3. See KEITH E. MASKUS, SHOULD CORE LABOR STANDARDS BE IMPOSED THROUGH
INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY? 5 (The World Bank Dev. Res. Group 1997), available
at http://ctrc.sice.oas.org/geograph/labor/maskus.pdf. See also Vicki Schultz et
al., Global Perspectives on Workplace Harassment Law: Proceedings of the 2004 Annual
Meeting, Association of American Law Schools Section on Labor Relations and
Employment Law, 8 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 151, 158 (2004) (pointing to the
long workplace "tradition of laws protecting individual dignity").
4. See id. at 5.
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Part II.
7. See Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit, 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1908) (holding that
"the general ... rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be
determined wholly by the law of the country where it is done"), overruled on other
grounds, Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704-05
(1962).
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abroad, which ultimately harms the U.S. economy. 8 This paper will
propose that an integrated and consistent application of labor and
employment law be utilized abroad by American corporations. The
paper will do so through an analysis of the history of judicial
decisions regarding major U.S. labor laws, their impact domestically
and abroad, their inconsistencies, and finally, make recommend-
ations for potential remediation.
II. Application of U.S. Labor and Employment Law Abroad
It has long been recognized that Congress has the authority to
enforce its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United
States. 9 However, the Supreme Court has frequently held that
despite such authority, when interpreting a statute, there is a
presumption against extraterritoriality. In his majority opinion in
Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, Justice Reed held that "legislation of
Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States." 10 Given this,
major labor and employment laws have been inconsistently
enforceable against United States corporations employing workers
overseas. Additionally, there are some differences in treatment for
foreign nationals and American citizens working for these same U.S.
corporations. Against this backdrop, decisions regarding the
applicability of U.S. labor laws abroad have reached a variety of
conclusions.
A. Title VII Applies to Americans Overseas But Not Foreigners
Employed by U.S. Corporations
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196411 prohibits
discrimination by covered employers on the basis of race, color,
8. See Michelle Sender, Claims by Non-Citizens Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act: Proper Extraterritorial Application in Torrico v. International Business
Machines?, 17 PACE INT'L L. REV. 131, 158 (2005) (arguing that disparate treatment
of otherwise similarly situated employees will lead to on-the-job conflict and
diminished incentive to perform).
9. Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284-85 (1949). See also Benz v.
Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957) (where extraterritorial
application of the Labor Management Relations Act was denied even to foreign
companies operating within the territory of the United States).
10. Id. at 285.
11. Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000h-6 (1964).
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religion, sex or national origin. 12 This statute aligns with the general
core labor standard of non-discrimination.13
In EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.,14 an American citizen of
Lebanese descent transferred with his American company from
Delaware to Saudi Arabia, where he was eventually fired. He first
filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission and later a civil suit, alleging violations of Title VII on
the basis of race, religion, and national origin.15 Considering the
extraterritorial applicability of Title VII in his majority opinion,
Chief Justice Rehnquist held that Title VII did not apply
extraterritorially to regulate employment practices of U.S.
corporations who employ U.S. citizens abroad.16 Thus, American
corporations were allowed to discriminate on the basis of race,
religion, and national origin against Americans employed by
American corporations abroad.
However, this interpretation was statutorily superseded.
Specifically rejecting the Arabian American decision, Congress
subsequently amended Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to
extend Title VII's protections to U.S. citizens working outside of the
United States.'7
This protection was limited, as Congress chose not to extend the
law as to aliens employed outside of the United States by American
corporations or their wholly owned subsidiaries. 8 As a result, if the
EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. plaintiff was Lebanese, rather than
Lebanese American, he would still have no relief under the current
statute for being fired from his American employer for being
Lebanese.
12. Id. § 2000e-2.
13. See MASKUS, supra note 3, at 23-29.
14. E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 247 (1991), superseded by
statute on other grounds as recognized in United States v. Passaro, 577 F.3d 207, 216 n.3
(4th Cir. 2009).
15. Id. at 247.
16. Id. at 249.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(c)(1) (1991) (as amended by Civil Rights Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1077, § 109(b)(1)(B)).
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c)(2)(B) (1991) (as amended by Civil Rights Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, § 109(b)(2)(B)). See also Iwata v. Stryker Corp.,
59 F. Supp. 2d 600, 604 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (holding that "[nlon-citizens working
outside the United States are not protected because they are not considered
employees").
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Additionally, Congress added a "foreign laws defense,"
bolstering protection for corporations. 19 Invoking the American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit holding, the defense permits an employer
to escape Title VII liability for discrimination against a U.S. citizen
employed abroad upon proof that compliance with Title VII would
cause it to violate the laws of the country where the employee is
stationed.20  By comparison, aliens working on U.S. soil for
American or foreign corporations are entitled to full Title VII
protection.21 The resulting paradox is that an American working for
a U.S. corporation in Saudi Arabia can be fired for his race or
religion, whereas an Arabian citizen working for an Arabian
corporation in New York is protected from a discriminatory firing.
B. The Americans with Disabilities Act Gives Similar Protection
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 199022 affords
similar protections against discrimination to Americans with
disabilities as the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title I of the ADA
applies to employment.23 The ADA states that a covered entity24
shall not discriminate against a qualified individual with a
disability. 25 This applies to job application procedures, hiring,
advancement and discharge of employees, workers' compensation,
job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment. 26
In dicta, the Arabian American Court noted that neither the ADA
nor the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (the
19. See Am. Banana Co., 213 U.S. at 357.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(b). See also Renee S. Orleans, Comment, Extraterritorial
Employment Protection Amendments of 1991: Congress Protects U.S. Citizens Vho Work
for U.S. Companies Abroad, 16 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 147, 166-67 (1992) (stating that
the extraterritorial amendments do not protect all U.S. citizens who work for U.S.
companies abroad because of the foreign compulsion doctrine).
21. See Mukkadam v. Permanent Mission of Saudi Arabia to the United
Nations, 111 F. Supp. 2d 457, 470-71 (S.D.N.Y 2000) (holding that Title VII is
applicable on U.S. soil regardless of the citizenship of the corporate employer, and
that the citizenship of the employee is not a determining factor for applicability).
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1990).
23. Id. §§ 12111-12117.
24. "Covered entity" can refer to an employment agency, labor organization, or
joint labor-management committee, and is generally an employer engaged in
interstate commerce and having fifteen or more workers. Id. §§ 12111(2), (5)(A).
25. Id. § 12112(a).
26. Id. § 12112(a).
2010]
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LMRDA, aka the Landrum-Griffin Act) of 195927 have been held to
apply overseas.28 Perhaps fearing the effects of that dictum,
Congress amended the ADA in 1991, giving it extraterritorial reach
similar to that of Title VII.29 American citizens employed by U.S.
companies in foreign countries are covered by the ADA, but foreign
nationals employed by U.S. companies overseas are not within the
ADA's definition of "employee." 30 There is evidence that some
courts have been willing to consider whether a foreign national
working for a U.S. corporation abroad but has some duties in the
United States may qualify as an employee. 31 However, the LMRDA
received no comparable amendment.
Given the current status of the ADA, a disabled American
accountant working in Nigeria for an American corporation must
receive reasonable accommodation for their disability. However,
the Nigerian accountant doing the same job for the same company
in the same office does not get that protection.
C. The Extraterritorial Limitation of the NLRA Follows That of
the LMRDA
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA, aka the Wagner Act)
was signed in 1935 to protect the rights of most workers in the
private sector to organize labor unions, to engage in collective
bargaining, and to take part in strikes and other forms of concerted
activity in support of their demands.32 The NLRA also established
the National Labor Relations Board.33
In McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, an
American union wanted to be certified under the NLRA as the
representative of Honduran and Jamaican seamen employed on a
Honduran-owned ship that was the wholly owned subsidiary of a
27. 29 U.S.C. § 401.
28. Arabian Am., 499 U.S. at 250-51.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c)(2)(B) (1991) (as amended by Civil Rights Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109(b)(2)(B), 105 Stat. 1071 (1991)).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4).
31. See Sender, supra note 8, at 156, demonstrating that courts have been
employing a "center of gravity" test to show whether a foreign national should be
considered to actually work on U.S. soil and therefore properly be subject to ADA
protection. Sender argues this creates a visible exception to the ADA's statutory
citizenship requirements. Id. at 157.
32. 29 U.S.C. § 141-187.
33. Id. § 153.
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U.S. corporation and whose ships were making regular calls in the
U.S. 34  In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court addressed
whether Congress intended the NLRA to apply overseas. Despite
broad jurisdictional language in the statute itself, the Court refused
to find congressional intent to apply the NLRA overseas.35 The case
appeared to leave the reach of the NLRA uncertain, as the Court's
language was general, and the facts of the case referred to American
organizers attempting to force a snap union election for foreign
employees on a foreign freighter temporarily docked in a U.S. port.36
However, the Arabian American decision cited McCulloch
extensively for the proposition that certain U.S. labor laws were
presumptively excluded from extraterritorial enforcement. 37 Lower
courts have found that even very limited temporary assignments
outside the United States to be without NLRA protection.38
Correspondingly, there is also no right of association, organization,
or union contract protection. In Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. NLRB, a
unionized tree removal team protested violations of their union
agreement, including lack of breaks, underpaid per diem rates, and
the termination and abandonment of two employees at the job
location in Canada.39
The Asplundh court held that NLRA protection did not apply to
unionized employees even though the temporary work assignment
outside the United States was limited to a 31-hour trip, and upheld
the terminations. 40  The Asplundh Tree decision cited Arabian
American and McCulloch extensively.41 Even domestic protection
under the NLRA is curtailed when conducting secondary picketing
of labor conditions of foreign employees working on foreign ships
docked at U.S. ports.42
To date, McCulloch has never been distinguished with regards
34. 372 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1963).
35. Id. at 19.
36. Id. at 13-15.
37. See Arabian Am., 499 U.S. at 248.
38. See infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
39. Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. N.L.R.B., 365 F.3d 168,171 (3d Cir. 2002).
40. Id. at 180.
41. Id. at 173-79.
42. See Am. Radio Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, Inc., 419 U.S. 215, 232 (1974)
(holding that the NLRA does not prevent courts from enjoining picketing aimed at
altering the relationship between foreign boatmen and the boat's foreign owners
while docked in Mobile, Alabama).
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to its views on extraterritoriality. The Arabian American decision has
not been distinguished, reversed, or amended by statute with
regards to its interpretation of McCulloch. The NLRA is currently
strictly a domestic statute.
D. The FLSA Applies Only to Americans Employed in the United
States, within its Possessions, and on its Military Bases
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) established a national
minimum wage, guaranteed time and a half for overtime in certain
jobs, and prohibited most employment of minors in "oppressive
child labor." 43 The FLSA also imposes certain record-keeping
requirements for wages and hours worked.44
The FLSA has been held to be applicable abroad in a very
narrow, limited sense. In Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, contractors
at an American military base in Bermuda sued for unpaid overtime
under the FLSA.45 The Court interpreted the FLSA as applying to
leased bases in foreign nations (as they were in the control of the
United States), and extended the application of the FLSA to U.S.
possessions (e.g., Puerto Rico, American Samoa, Guam, etc.). 46
However, this limited expansion is the outer limit of the protection
offered, as the statute specifically states that this "title shall not
apply with respect to any employee whose services during the
workweek are performed in a workplace within a foreign
country." 47 No cases have challenged the unambiguous language of
the statute. Americans and foreigners alike are afforded no FLSA
protection working for U.S. corporations abroad. As a result, U.S.
corporations abroad may pay below the federal minimum wage and
employ children in ways that violate U.S. law on U.S. soil.
The upshot of the Vermilya-Brown decision is that possessions
and bases in foreign lands have been deemed to be U.S. soil.48
Presumptively, unless the statute specifically states otherwise, all
U.S. labor and employment laws are applicable on American
possessions and overseas military bases in the wake of Vermilya-
Brown. However, this is cold comfort for Americans abroad not
43. 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(1), 206, 207, 212-13.
44. Id. § 211(c).
45. Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377,379 (1948).
46. Id. at 386-88.
47. 29 U.S.C. § 213(o.
48. See Vermilya-Brown, 335 U.S. at 386-88.
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contracted by the Department of Defense or the Department of
State.
E. The ADEA Generally Applies to Americans Employed by U.S.
Corporations Anywhere
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)
prohibits employment discrimination against persons 40 years of
age or older in the United States. 49 Furthermore, the ADEA gives
slightly less protection than Title VII in that the ADEA applies to
employers of 20 or more employees, 50  exempting smaller
organizations from offering ADEA protection.51 The 20 employees
can include overseas employees.52
The ADEA was never a victim of the broad Arabian American
decision. The Arabian American Court recognized that Congress had
intentionally amended the ADEA to apply overseas by addressing
the subject of conflicts with foreign laws and procedures.5 3
Originally, the ADEA itself was silent as to its application to non-
citizens employed with U.S. companies abroad54 The legislative
history of the ADEA indicates that this omission was intentional,
meant to infer non-applicability.55
Indeed, after several earlier courts had held that the ADEA did
not apply overseas,5 6 in 1984 Congress amended Section 11(f) to
provide: "The term 'employee' includes any individual who is a
citizen of the United States employed by an employer in a
workplace in a foreign country."5 7 Congress also amended Section
4(g)(1), which states: "If an employer controls a corporation whose
49. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 631(a).
50. By contrast, Title VII stipulates a 15-person floor for applicability. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(a)(2).
51. See 29 U.S.C. § 630(b).
52. Morelli v. Cedel, 141 F.3d 39, 45 (2nd Cir. 1998).
53. Arabian Am., 499 U.S. at 245.
54. Id.
55. See H.R. Rep. No. 98-1037, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1984), where the ADEA
was, "carefully worded to apply only to citizens of the United States who are
working for U.S. corporations or their subsidiaries. It does not apply to foreign
nationals working for such corporations in a foreign workplace and it does not
apply to foreign companies which are not controlled by U.S. firms."
56. See De Yoreo v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 377, 378 (D.C. Tex.
1985) (stating that, to date, all the courts addressing this issue have ruled against
extraterritorial application of the ADEA).
57. 29 U.S.C. § 630(f).
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place of incorporation is in a foreign country, any practice by such
corporation prohibited under this section shall be presumed to be
such practice by such employer."5 8
The express purpose of these changes was to "mak[e]
provisions of the ADEA apply to citizens of the United States
employed in foreign countries by U.S. corporations or their
subsidiaries." 59 The Arabian American Court noted that Title VII
could be similarly modified, stating "Congress, should it wish to do
so, may similarly amend Title VII and in doing so will be able to
calibrate its provisions in a way that we cannot."60
Despite this enlargement of ADEA protection to U.S. citizens
working abroad, it continued to afford no protection to noncitizens
of the United States working abroad. In O'Loughlin v. The Pritchard
Corp., a Cuban national residing in New Jersey was selected at age
60 for a position in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) with an
American company.61 He was trained in Kansas City before being
sent to the UAE, where UAE law restricted work visas for foreign
employees over 60.62 While some waivers to this rule were initially
granted, his visa eventually expired and he was laid off from this
project and given no work back in the U.S.63 When he sued in
Kansas federal court, the court held that application of ADEA to
citizens but not to noncitizens abroad was permissible, and did not
violate an employee's equal protection rights.64
Noncitizens have been refused ADEA protection despite
employment by a U.S. corporation in a variety of situations.
Resident alien plaintiffs fall outside the protection of the ADEA,
even though employment interviews and hiring decisions may have
been made in New York, because "the job which plaintiff sought
was to be performed in Beijing and Hong Kong." 65 Plaintiffs are not
covered by ADEA where they are a citizen of Lebanon, a resident of
Beirut, and "[were] employed exclusively at the [American]
58. 29 U.S.C. § 623(h)(1).
59. S. Rep. No. 98-467, at 27 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2974, 2975.
60. Arabian Am., 499 U.S. at 259.
61. O'Loughlin v. The Pritchard Corp., 972 F. Supp. 1352, 1357 (D. Kan. 1997).
62. Id. at 1357-58.
63. Id. at 1358-59.
64. Id. at 1363-65.
65. Hu v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, 76 F. Supp. 2d 476, 477-
78 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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University [of Beirut]'s Beirut campus."66 Plaintiffs employed by a
Japanese subsidiary of a U.S. employer are not "employees"
protected by ADEA or Title VII since they are not U.S. citizens and
lived in Japan during the time of employment.67
Emphasizing the low level of protection, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC, charged with enforcement of the
ADEA) does not interpret the ADEA to have any applicability to
aliens employed by U.S. companies in a foreign workplace. 68
Currently, the ADEA protects U.S. citizens working for American
corporations abroad, but excludes foreigners who work shoulder to
shoulder with them.69
F. The LMRDA Appears to be Limited by Its Mention in the
Arabian American Decision
The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
(LMRDA) recognized the right of employees to nominate
candidates, vote in elections, attend meetings, and other rights of
association and expression. 70 Dissimilar from the treatment of the
ADA after the Arabian American decision, no such amendment was
made for the extraterritorial application of the LMRDA. As such,
the LMRDA is limited only to U.S. soil, having no extraterritorial
effect. No decision to date has cited or distinguished the Arabian
American decision on this point. The right of labor to freely associate
and vote has been recognized as a core labor standard, and as such
is worthy of universal export.71
G. FELA has No Extraterritorial Application
The Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA) was passed in
1908 in response to the high number of railroad deaths at the turn of
66. Iskandar v. Am. Univ. of Beirut, No. 98 Civ. 6616 (WHP), 1999 WL 595651,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 1999).
67. Iwata, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 604-05.
68. See E.E.O.C. Enforcement Guidance N-915.039, § A (Mar. 1989).
69. See Mary M. Madden, Casenote & Comment, Strengthening Protection of
Employees at Home and Abroad: The Extraterritorial Application of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 20 HAMLINE L. REV.
739, 759-66 (2002) (arguing that even protection for U.S. citizens abroad is limited,
given the number of loopholes and the size of the aegis of the foreign compulsion
doctrine).
70. 29 U.S.C. § 401 (a).
71. MASKUS, supra note 3, at 5.
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the century. 72 The FELA permits railroad workers who are not
covered by regular workers compensation laws to sue their
companies over their injury claims. 73
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to consider the
extraterritorial application of FELA when an American worker
employed by an American railroad company was injured over the
border in Canada.74 In the New York Central R. Co. v. Chisholm, the
Court held that despite broad jurisdictional language, the FELA
"contains no words which definitely disclose an intention to give it
extraterritorial effect."75
Chisholm continues to be the standard for FELA, cited
extensively by the Second, 76 Third,77 and Ninth78 Circuits, as well as
many district court decisions.79 There is no FELA protection for
Americans or foreigners working for U.S. railroad carriers across the
border. Protection for those workers ceases once the train moves
across the boundaries of U.S. soil.
H. Other U.S. Labor and Employment Standards are Generally
Excluded from Extraterritorial Application
The Equal Pay Act (EPA) of 1963 amended the FLSA to prohibit
discrimination on account of sex in the payment of wages by
employers.8 0 It is important to note that the EPA does not contain
any intent requirement within the statutory language. Given this,
subsequent decisions have interpreted the statute as having no
intent requirement.81 Liability under the EPA is established by
72. 42 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (2006).
73. Id.§ 51.
74. New York Cent. R. Co. v. Chisholm, 268 U.S. 29, 30 (1925).
75. Id. at 31.
76. Labor Union of Pico Korea, Ltd. v. Pico Prods., Inc., 968 F.2d 191, 195 (2d
Cir. 1992); Rogers v. Consol. Rail Corp., 948 F.2d 858, 860-63 (2d Cir. 1991); Taylor v.
At. Mar. Co., 179 F.2d 597, 600 (2d Cir. 1950), vacated, 181 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1950).
77. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 365 F.3d at 175.
78. Williamson v. Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 221 F.2d 5, 12 (9th Cir. 1955).
79. See, e.g., Rogers v. Consol. Rail Corp., 688 F. Supp. 835, 836 (N.D.N.Y. 1988);
Cruz v. Chesapeake Shipping Inc., 738 F. Supp. 809, 819 (D. Del. May 17, 1990),
affid, 932 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1991); Priestman v. Canadian Pac. Ltd., 782 F. Supp. 681,
683 (D. Me. 1992).
80. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006).
81. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-48 (1976) (holding that, in order
to establish an equal protection clause violation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a
challenged action was motivated by an intent to discriminate), superseded by statute,
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meeting the three elements of the prima facie case, regardless of the
intention of the employer. 82 As such, the EPA imposes strict liability
on employers who engage in wage discrimination on the basis of
gender.83
The EPA was enacted as an amendment to Section Six of the
FLSA. For this reason, the EEOC - tasked with enforcing the EPA
- interprets the EPA as having no extraterritorial applicability,8 4
like the FLSA.85
The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) allows an employee
to take unpaid leave due to a serious health condition that makes
the employee unable to perform his job or to care for a sick family
member or to care for a new son or daughter (including by birth,
adoption, or foster care).86 The FMLA applies to "employees who
are employed within any State of the United States, the District of
Columbia or any Territory or possession of the United States." 87
While never challenged in court, it is clear that by including
possessions in the language of the statute, by deduction, it is likely
the Vermilya-Brown logic would be employed here, which would
exclude foreign soil as it is not expressly implicated by the statute.
As a result, U.S. citizens, resident aliens, and foreign labor are
excluded from coverage under the FMLA if not employed within
the territorial boundaries of the United States.
Accordingly, neither the EPA nor the FMLA are enforceable
abroad outside of U.S. soil and possessions. As a result, the EPA,
FMLA, FLSA, NLRA, LMRDA, FELA, and the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA)88 are firmly in the no extraterritorial
Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), as recognized in Chapman v. Nicholson,
579 F. Supp. 1504, 1507 (N.D. Ala. 1984).
82. Maxwell v. City of Tucson, 803 F.2d 444, 446 (9th Cir. 1986).
83. Strecker v. Grand Forks County Soc. Serv. Bd., 640 F.2d 96, 99 n.1 (8th Cir.
1980).
84. See E.E.O.C., Policy Guidance N-915.039, Application of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) and the Equal Pay Act of 1963
(EPA) to American Firms Overseas, Their Overseas Subsidiaries, and Foreign Firms
§ I(B) (Mar. 3, 1989), reprinted in 2 E.E.O.C., COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 605 (1989),
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/extraterritorial-adea-epa.html. Pre-
sumably, however, it will still be applicable on U.S. possessions and military bases.
85. See Gantchar v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 93 C 1457, 1995 WL 137053 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 28, 1995) (unpublished mem.) (upholding the EEOC's posture).
86. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54.
87. 29 C.F.R. § 825.105(b).
88. Maurais v. Snyder, No. C.A. 00-2133, 2000 WL 1368024, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Sept.
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application camp. Not quite balancing the other side are
extraterritorial affirmations for the ADA, ADEA, and Title VII.
However, all three remain subject to modification by foreign law, 89
known as the "foreign compulsion doctrine," which provides that
U.S. companies hiring U.S. citizens abroad are not required to
comply with U.S. laws where compliance with them "would cause
such employer, or a corporation controlled by such employer, to
violate the laws of the country in which such workplace is
located."90 This doctrine subsumes the application of U.S. law to
any contravening foreign law of the sovereign nation.91
III. Foreign Labor is More Strongly Protected in the
United States than Americans Employed by
U.S. Corporations Abroad
Conversely, aliens in the United States working for foreign and
domestic corporations are protected by the full range of U.S. laws
and regulations while employed on U.S. soil. The Court in Espinoza
v. Farah Mfg. Co. held that aliens in the United States are protected
from discrimination because Title VII uses the term "individual"
rather than "citizen," and because of the alien-exemption provision
(which says that Title VII shall not apply to aliens employed outside
any State).92
Expanding the protection of aliens to soil that is questionably
American, the court in Mukkadam v. Permanent Mission of Saudi
Arabia to the United Nations extended Title VII protection to a
plaintiff who filed suit claiming that the defendant wrongfully
terminated her following a pattern of harassment and gender
discrimination.93 The defendant argued for dismissal on various
grounds, including lack of subject matter jurisdiction because of
immunity from suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA).94
14, 2000) (unpublished mem.).
89. See Am. Banana Co., 213 U.S. at 356.
90. Mahoney v. RFE/RL, 47 F.3d 447,450 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
91. Id.
92. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 92-96 (1973), superseded by statute on
other grounds as stated in In re Martinez v. Marcel Watch Corp., No. 89200085, 1990
WL 512157, at 2 (O.C.A.H.O. Mar. 22 1990).
93. Mukkadam, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 474.
94. Id. at 461.
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The court, however, determined that the defendant was not
immune from suit under the FSIA because defendant's employment
of the plaintiff constituted a commercial activity within the meaning
of the statute.95 Since plaintiff's employment took place in the
United States, and her discriminatory discharge and retaliation
claims were based upon her employment,, the court held that
plaintiff's allegations, if proved, would establish that her
employment came within the commercial activity exception to the
FSIA.96 In addition, the court held that Congress intended Title VII
to apply within the United States for activities of foreign
employers. 97 Since the defendant was not immune from suit under
the FSIA, it could be held liable under Title VII.98 No suit has
successfully denied the applicability of U.S. labor and employment
laws to any alien legally employed on U.S. soil by an American or
foreign corporation.
Given these decisions, it appears clear that aliens working
legally on U.S. soil are entitled to the full range of labor and
employment law protections enjoyed by U.S. citizens within U.S.
borders. The issue that land within U.S. borders may not technically
be American (such as the United Nations or an embassy or
consulate) seems to be no barrier to relief for aliens under most U.S.
labor and employment laws.
Undocumented foreign workers employed on U.S. soil even
enjoy some protections under U.S. employment law. It is clear that
Congress intended strong restrictions on the employment of
undocumented workers, passing the Immigration Reform and
Control Act (IRCA) of 1986.99 The IRCA makes it unlawful to hire,
recruit, or refer for employment an "unauthorized" alien, or for any
person to be hired without verifying the person's eligibility to
work.100  Nor may an employer continue to employ an
undocumented worker.101 An elaborate scheme has been created to
allow prospective employers to verify job applicants' eligibility for
95. Id. at 466.
96. Id. at 467.
97. Id. at 470-71.
98. Id. at 474.
99. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Pub. L. No. 99-603,
100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
100. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1) (Supp. 1986).
101. Id. § 1324a(a)(2).
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work.1 02 The Attorney General and his designees investigate and
adjudicate violations, and may levy both civil and criminal
penalties 03
However, despite the protectionist intent behind IRCA, the
Supreme Court has vested strong safeguards for undocumented
labor on U.S. soil. In DeCanas v. Bica, the Court reasoned that
"acceptance by illegal aliens of jobs on substandard terms as to
wages and working conditions can seriously depress wage scales
and working conditions of citizens and legally admitted aliens; and
employment of illegal aliens under such conditions can diminish the
effectiveness of labor unions."10 4 Additionally, the Court in Sure-
Tan v. NLRB recognized the application of the NLRA to
undocumented workers, 05 and implicitly recognized the protection
of the FLSA by awarding back pay.106 Reinstatement was not
available as a remedy due to their illegal status.107
IV. Unequal Protection
These decisions and the presumption against extraterritoriality
leave us with three distinct, and seemingly unbalanced, categories
of employees. American workers employed by U.S. corporations
abroad have severely limited employment law protection. Foreign
nationals working directly next to the American worker at these
same U.S. corporations have no protection under U.S. labor and
employment laws. Yet aliens working for U.S. or foreign
corporations within U.S. borders enjoy the full range of protection as
U.S. workers domestically, 108 and have greater coverage than an
102. Id. § 1324a(b).
103. Id. §§ 1324a(e), (f).
104. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356-57 (1976).
105. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 467 U.S. 883, 891 (1984), superseded by statute as
stated in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 314 N.L.R.B. 683, 685 (1994).
106. Sure-Tan, Inc., 467 U.S. at 901. However, back pay as a remedy was
eliminated by the IRCA in 1986. See Hoffman Plastics Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B.,
535 U.S. 137, 151 (2002) (interpreting the IRCA).
107. Sure-Tan, Inc., 467 U.S. at 902.
108. See, however, Keith Sealing, Sex, Allies and BFOQs: The Case for Not Allowing
Foreign Corporations to Violate Title VII in the United States, 55 ME. L. REV. 89, 90
(2002), arguing that U.S. employees suffer reduced protection in the United States
when employed by foreign corporations, as these businesses can use treaties and
BFOQ exceptions not available to U.S. corporations to subvert American labor law
on U.S. soil. Sealing contends that the confusion started with the Supreme Court's
"we express no view" footnote in Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176,
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American worker employed by an American corporation overseas.
Indeed, undocumented workers in the United States have greater
protection under the FLSA and NLRA than do Americans working
for U.S. corporations abroad.
There are areas in which it makes business sense not to impose
American labor laws on American corporations, such as
compensation. Specifically, the court in Pfeiffer v. Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co.
noted that "having to pay American wages to foreign workers might
of course impose a crushing competitive disadvantage on American
firms abroad." 109 There is no incentive to impose the FLSA abroad,
as wages are based on markets, and the minimum wage in the
United States is likely to have no easily translatable equivalent in a
foreign locale. Additionally, the administrative difficulties of fixing
a relative minimum wage for every location in which an American
company might do business is nearly impossible. It is also beyond
the scope of the FLSA. Furthermore, as long the wages paid are not
the functional equivalent of, or actual slavery, such wages are truly
the business of the sovereign nation.
It has been demonstrated that "there are short-term benefits
from employment discrimination which are wholly separate from
savings in administrative and operating costs." 110 However, such
discrimination has high costs which significantly outweigh any
short term benefits."' Furthermore, core labor standards are
financially 1 2 and ethically feasible and commendable to export
189-90 n.19 (1982), regarding whether a Japanese citizenship requirement for certain
positions at a Japanese company operating in the United States can be a BFOQ or
utilize the business necessity defense. Id. at 98-99.
109. Pfeiffer v. Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co., 755 F.2d 554, 557 (7th Cir. 1985), superseded
by statute on other grounds as stated in DeYoreo v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 785
F.2d 1282, 1283 (5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
110. Jonathan Turley, Transnational Discrimination and the Economics of
Extraterritorial Regulation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 339, 388 (1990) (citing John J. Donohue, Is
Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411, 1418-19 (1986)).
111. See GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 101-09 (1957) (stating
that over time, any short-term benefits to discrimination will be eroded by labor
savings to employers lacking aversion to hiring minorities "and therefore gain a
competitive advantage").
112. See Donohue, supra note 110 (arguing that Title VII is an efficient wealth-
maximizing measure with positive economic effects, thereby making global
enforcement desirable). See also Madden, supra note 69, at 740 (arguing that the
United States "needs to assure that its citizens can compete internationally, and in
order to do so, citizens must be able to accept employment abroad without losing
the protection of discrimination laws enjoyed domestically").
20101
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
globally.113 The United States protects the five core standards on its
soil,11 4 but noticeably fails to require U.S. corporations to uphold
these abroad, sometimes even in the case of its own citizens.
U.S. corporations operate in many countries where several or
all of these five standards are not upheld." 5 The United States will
not apply the LMRDA or the NLRA abroad, and countries such as
Mexico, Indonesia, and Malaysia all have severe restrictions on
collective bargaining and freedom of association.116 Child labor,
prohibited in the United States by the FLSA, is utilized across the
globe with little regulation.1 7 Slave labor remains accessible in
several countries.11 8 Discrimination in various forms remains a
global phenomenon.19
Simply because an American corporation sets up shop in a
country that permits or even encourages violation of a core labor
standard (in the name of economic efficiency, tradition, or some
other reason), the American government should not permit
American corporations or their wholly owned subsidiaries to violate
the core labor standards, which are a subset of basic global civil
rights.
In addition to the economic disincentives, 120 it creates a double
standard, allowing representatives of the United States abroad to
113. See MASKUS, supra note 3, at 1-2 (arguing that labor standards have moral
and monetary reasons for export and that such changes should be accomplished
through trade sanctions and incentives).
114. These core standards are nondiscrimination in employment based on
gender, ethnicity, and other similar factors; freedom of association; collective
bargaining over working conditions; prohibition of forced labor; and prohibition of
exploitative forms of child labor. See id. at 5.
115. Id. at 2-5.
116. Id. at 54.
117. Id. at 2-3.
118. Id. at 3.
119. See id. at 4, noting that even governments participate in forms of
discrimination (citing social goals), such as job set-asides in the United States and
ethnic preferences in Malaysia. However, most discrimination is private and does
not appear to satisfy any social goals. See also Turley, supra note 110, at 390 (stating
that the overall "effect of transnational discrimination is that minority employment
abroad will be reduced").
120. Donahue, supra note 110, at 1418-19 (stating that while some employers
engaging in discrimination will derive value from it, employers will lose money -
and possibly their businesses - in the long run as competing nondiscriminatory
employers gain the benefit of both a wider employee pool and lower employment
costs).
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operate in ways we find deplorable domestically. In some cases,
this double standard even allows unfair treatment of Americans.121
V. Foreign Compulsion Doctrine is an Aegis Against the
Encroachment of U.S. Labor Laws Against Sovereignty
In Arabian American, the Court recognized that if Congress had
intentionally amended a statute to apply overseas, it would have
addressed the subject of conflicts with foreign laws and
procedures. 22 Legislatively amending the ADEA to apply abroad,
Congress specifically addressed potential conflicts with foreign law
by providing that it is not unlawful for an employer to take any
action prohibited by the ADEA "where such practices involve an
employee in a workplace in a foreign country, and compliance with
[the ADEA] would cause such employer ... to violate the laws of the
country in which such workplace is located." 123 Title VII, by
contrast, fails to address conflicts with the laws of other nations.
Congress does not idly or silently enter into conflicts with
foreign sovereigns or international principles. However, in Blackmer
v. United States,124  the applicable statute was applied
extraterritorially because it operates "solely between the
Government of the United States and the citizen. The mere giving
of such a notice to the citizen in the foreign country ... is in no sense
an invasion of any right of the foreign government." 25
By way of comparison, the court in Foley Bros. stated that "an
intention ... to regulate labor conditions which are the primary
concern of a foreign country should not be attributed to Congress in
the absence of a clearly expressed purpose."126  This clearly
implicates foreign nationals working for U.S. corporations overseas.
However, when discussing Americans working abroad for U.S.
corporations, the law operates solely between the U.S. government
121. This is a result of the fact that the EPA, FMLA, FLSA, NLRA, LMRDA,
FELA, and ERISA are all non-applicable to Americans working for American
corporations abroad.
122. Arabian Am., 499 U.S. at 256.
123. See Mahoney, 47 F.3d at 450-51 (excusing a U.S. corporation employing U.S.
citizens in Germany from complying with the ADEA, where compliance would
require it to violate a collective bargaining agreement with a foreign labor union,
because the agreement qualified under the "foreign laws" exception to the ADEA).
124. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
125. Id. at 439.
126. Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 286.
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and the American citizen working overseas for a U.S. corporation.
This is no invasion of sovereignty.
Additionally, the extraterritorial application of U.S. labor laws
to foreign nationals employed abroad does not necessarily offend
the Foley Bros. principle. If a foreign nation's legislation is silent on a
labor standard generated in the United States, then it is not of a
"primary concern" 127 to that host nation. Where the foreign
sovereign has inimical or contrary laws, then the "foreign
compulsion doctrine" is invoked and the Foley Bros. principle is
satisfied.
Congress could assist by clarifying the definitions contained in
foreign compulsion doctrine. A conflicting law does not necessarily
infer that the U.S. employment law must be broken.128 On this basis,
some legal analysts advocate enforcing U.S. law extraterritorially in
the face of foreign compulsion doctrine when the foreign law does
not result in criminal charges or severe sanctions, but is instead
compulsory guidance.129 Some consider the protections an essential
liberty, and advocate enforcement "regardless of the labor laws and
conditions in the host nation."130 Other critics consider foreign
compulsion doctrine "an escape device for employers" 131 that is
"directly related to Congress's failure to define law,"132 and the
imprecision of the EEOC's articulation of the "three statutory
elements that must be satisfied to establish the defense." 33
However, rather than require that U.S. corporations take risks
with their host nations, Congress could provide the "clear statement
rule" the Supreme Court is looking for by rewording U.S.
employment laws to apply extraterritorially to core labor standards.
Continuing to allow U.S. corporations and their subsidiaries to rely
127. Id.
128. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 441. See also Michael
A. Warner, Jr., Comment, Strangers in a Strange Land: Foreign Compulsion and the
Extraterritorial Application of United States Employment Law, 11 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
371, 377 (1990). That an activity was "compelled" means that the employer could
not obey U.S. law without violating the laws of its foreign host country. Id.
129. See Madden, supra note 69, at 753.
130. Paul Frantz, International Employment: Antidiscrimination Law Should Follow
Employees Abroad, 14 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 227, 259 (2005).
131. LaToya S. Brown, The Title VII Tug-of-War: Application of U.S. Employment
Discrimination Law Extraterritorially, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 833, 851 (2007).
132. Id. at 852.
133. Id.
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on the vagueness of the foreign compulsion doctrine as a defense to
otherwise illegal practices undermines the intent of the employment
laws Congress has passed. This neglect of an entire group of U.S.
employees does not reflect the purpose of the amendments to U.S.
employment legislations, which was to expand workers' rights.
Should a host nation's legislation remain silent on a core labor
standard, U.S. courts should have no judicial bar to extraterritorial
application of U.S. labor and employment laws to foreign nationals
employed at U.S. firms.134 There remain legislative barriers, as
currently Title VII and the ADA specifically exclude the application
of the law to foreign nationals employed overseas by Americans. 135
U.S. resident aliens working abroad remain in limbo, as neither
citizens nor foreign nationals, and are unprotected by Title VII, the
ADEA, and the ADA. Yet U.S. resident aliens represent an
important workforce component dedicated to U.S. interests.1 36
Congress should amend these statutes and require U.S. corporations
to follow U.S. labor standards wherever they operate if it is
permissible by the host nation's laws.
Additionally, proper negotiation in "friendship, commerce, and
navigation" (FCN) treaties137 containing clear purpose statements
could end the use of the foreign compulsion doctrine as a haven for
discriminatory practices by U.S. corporations operating abroad.
134. It also seems unlikely that U.S. courts will require overseas suppliers of U.S.
corporations to adhere to local labor laws any time soon. See Doe v. Walmart, 572
F.3d 677, 683-85 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that U.S. employers are not liable for failure
to adequately monitor their suppliers and did not hold actual knowledge that their
suppliers violated local labor laws in contravention of the companies' "Standards
for Suppliers").
135. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(c)(2) (1991) (as amended by Civil Rights Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1077, § 109(b)(1)(B)); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c)(2)(B)
(1991) (as amended by Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, 105 Stat. 1071, §
109(b)(2)(B)).
136. See Frantz, supra note 130, at 258-59 (arguing that by becoming a resident
alien, an individual is committing to the United States and its values and is paying
its taxes, which entitles the individual to the full protection of U.S. labor law).
137. See E.E.O.C., Notice No. 915.002, Enforcement Guidance on Application of
Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act to Conduct Overseas and to
Foreign Employers Discriminating in the United States (Oct. 20, 1993), reprinted in 2
E.E.O.C., COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 605 (1993), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/
policy/docs/extraterritorial-vii-ada.html (An FCN treaty is defined as one that
"grants jurisdiction to one country over another country's corporations. Under the
terms of a typical FCN treaty, each signatory grants legal status to the other party's
corporations so that those corporations can conduct business in the foreign country
on a comparable basis with that country's domestic companies.").
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Additionally, given the U.S. government's interests in the safety and
treatment of its citizens wherever they may reside and work, the
presumption against extraterritoriality in the employment and labor
law context should be reviewed and revised.138
VI.Conclusion
The United States' current posture of extraterritorial
applicability of its labor laws is conflicted. Despite the global and
American recognition of five core labor standards, the United States
requires its overseas corporations to follow a sparse few of those
relating to discrimination. Furthermore, it only applies those to
American citizens, totally neglecting foreign nationals working for
U.S. corporations overseas. Americans working for U.S.
corporations abroad often have no equivalent of the U.S. recognition
of rights of collective bargaining and association, restrictions on
child labor, bans on slave labor, rights to equal pay for equal work,
and rights to family and medical leave.
Foreign employees at overseas U.S. employers are even more
vulnerable, receiving none of the protections against discrimination
their American counterparts in the cubicle next to them receive.
Meanwhile, aliens working legally in the U.S. for foreign and
domestic corporations enjoy every labor and employment protection
enjoyed by U.S. citizens on U.S. soil.
The United States must modify the extraterritorial application
of its labor and employment laws to give universal protection to all
Americans abroad and export the five core labor standards to all
employees of U.S. corporations where the laws of the host country
permit. American corporations must be held to consistent American
standards for the appropriate treatment of workers wherever they
operate. Anything less would be un-American, and a failure of
equal protection.
138. See Jonathan Turley, "When in Rome": Multinational Misconduct and the
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 598, 655 (1990) stating
that
[wihether the division of extraterritoriality cases is the result of conceptual
or political bias, or simply some precedential anomaly, the presumption
against extraterritoriality remains an unevenly applied, highly chauvinistic
canon of construction.... As long as the courts require a clear expression of
congressional intent for extraterritorial jurisdiction.., the presumption will
continue to produce curious results.
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